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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

VERA ARLENE FERGUSON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 14639

LOWELL GENE FERGUSON,
Defendant and
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE LEGAL PRECEDENTS FROM THIS COURT HOLDING THAT A SUBSEQUENTLY ANNULLED REMARRIAGE DOES NOT TERMINATE THE OBLIGATION TO PAY
ALIMONY ARISING FROM A FORMER MARRIAGE.
Defendant bases much of his argument in support
of the trial court's decision not to award alimony on Utah
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Code Ann. §30-1-17.2, in which the legislature provided
that under certain circumstances alimony could be awarded
after an annulment.

However, §30-1-17.2 does not preclude

an award of alimony in the present case for two reasons:
First, §30-1-17.2 is silent on the effect on prior alimony
of an annulled remarriage and second, by its terms, §30-117.2 does not apply to the present case.
Defendant argues that by enacting §30-1-17.2,
the legislature sought to overrule the holdings of the
Utah Supreme Court in Cecil v. Cecil, 11 U.2d 155, 356 P.2d
279 (1960) and Kent v. Kent, 228 U.2d 34, 497 P.2d 652
(1972).

However, if the legislature wanted to preclude the

reinstatement of the prior alimony, it could have done so.
Instead, in §30-1-17.2, the legislature merely provided
that in some cases alimony could be awarded in an annulment proceeding.

Thus, the legislature has not acted with

respect to a reinstatement of prior alimony.
Furthermore, §30-1-17.2 provides for an award of
alimony only under certain circumstances.

§30-1-17.2 pro-

vides:
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If the parties have accumulated any property or
acquired any obligations subsequent to the marriage, where there is a genuine need arising
from economic change of circumstances due to the
marriage, or if there are children born, or
expected, the Court may make temporary and final
orders, and subsequently modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and obligations, the children and their custody and visitation, and the support and maintenance of the
parties and the children, as may be equitable.
The children born to the parties after the date
of the marriage, shall be deemed the legitimate
children of both parties for all purposes.
None of these circumstances exist in the present
case.

The parties neither accumulated properties nor

acquired obligations.
parties did not change.
ted.

The economic circumstances of the
Nor were children born or expec-

Under §30-1-17.2, then, an award of alimony after

Mrs. Ferguson's second marriage would not have been proper.
Defendant argues both that there was a change
of economic circumstances due to Mrs. Ferguson's remarriage
(Respondent's Brief, pages 7 and 8) and that there was not
such a change (Respondent's Brief, pages 8 and 9).

In

fact, the only change of circumstances that occurred during
the second marriage was the cessation of alimony payments.
As Mrs. Ferguson was entitled to have those payments reinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stated upon her annulment, there was no change of economic
circumstances.
The change in economic circumstances upon which
Mrs. Ferguson based her request for increased alimony and
child support were the additional living expenses since
the divorce from Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Ferguson's ability
to pay additional sums.
Defendant also argues that the Cecil and Kent
cases cited in appellant's brief are factually distinguishable in some particulars.

But in both cases the issue

whether alimony from a prior marraige should continue
after an annulment was squarely presented and in both
cases, this Court held that alimony should continue.

In

the absence of any contrary precedent, the lower court
should have ordered payment of alimony.
Defendant also continues to attempt a collateral
attack on the annulment (Respondent's Brief, page 10).

As

appellant's original brief points out, this court held in
Cecil that the annulment may not be collaterally attacked.
Defendant cites Austead v. Austead, 2 U.2d 49,
69 P.2d 284 (1954) as authority for the proposition that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
-4- may contain errors.

Mrs. Ferguson must show exceptional circumstances to
entitle her to alimony after a remarriage.

However,

Austead did not involve an annulled remarriage and thus
is not controlling on the issue decided in Cecil and Kent.
In any event, it may be argued that an annulment is what
the Utah Supreme Court has regarded as an exceptional circumstance to entitle Mrs. Ferguson to a reinstatement of
alimony.
Although defendant argues that plaintiff has
not demonstrated a need for alimony,Mrs. Ferguson did
demonstrate need to the lower court as shown by the fact
that the court increased the amount of child support to be
paid.

Whether Mrs. Ferguson sought alimony from her

second husband or whether her second husband had the ability to pay alimony is irrelevant to the question of Mrs.
Ferguson's present need for support.

This is another

attempt by defendant to attack the annulment proceeding
collaterally.
Defendant complains of the rulings in the court
below regarding discovery.

Plaintiff served interrogatories

and a request for production of documents on defendant on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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June 12, 1975.

Defendant failed to respond.

On December

3, 1975, plaintiff moved to compel answers and a response.
On December 16, 1975, the court ordered defendant to
respond.

Defendant still failed to respond.

As a result

of that failure, on January 8, 1976, the court entered an
order of sanctions, precluding defendant from offering
evidence as to his financial status because his financial
status was the subject of the interrogatories and request
for production.
Defendant now attempts to base an argument on
that preclusion.

The order of sanctions was a valid exer-

cise of the court's power to impose sanctions for failure
to prevent discovery on defendant and defendant should
not be now permitted to base an argument on that preclusion.
Defendant also argues that the order of sanctions
amounted to a default judgment.
18).

(Respondent's Brief, page

There is no basis for such an argument.

The differ-

ence between precluding defendant from offering proof on
a certain issue, as to which he refused discovery, and
the entry of a default are so obvious as not to require
comment.
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The argument that the lower court could not
award child support and attorney fees in excess of the
amount sought in the original order to show cause is
equally without merit.

As the court pointed out in

Midwest Supply, Inc., v. Waters, Bl Nev. 210, 510 P.2d
876 (1973), a fraud action, the prayer for relief does
not limit recovery, except in a default action.

As

pointed out above, this action cannot be characterized as
a default action in view of defendant's vigorous contest.
Further, as defendant pointed out this is an action in
equity and "equity has the power to render full and appropriate relief to all parties regardless of the specific
prayers."

Federici v. Lehman, 230 Ore. 70, 368 P.2d 611

(1962) at 612-13.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to explain adequately why
the result in this action should not be governed by the
courts decisions in Cecil and Kent.

In light of that

failure, this case should be remanded to the trial court
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for an award of back alimony and an increase in future
alimony.

Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Ellen Maycock
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000
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I hereby certify that I served two copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief, by hand delivering the same, to
Roger D. Sandack, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent,
at 370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah
this
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84111,

day of November, 1976.
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